

**2 March 2010**

**Clarence E. Lightner Public Safety Center**

The following was developed jointly by Kling Stubbins, Clancy & Theys/Archer Western and City Staff, responding to the CELPSC Project Memorandum #2 dated 25 February 2010 by Councilors Stephenson, Crowder, and Gaylord. Each section of the memo has been excerpted and leads the section for the response developed.

Please find attached a compendium of the time line of the project actions and reviews by Council and BED Committee plus reports provided in support of those meetings, from 2003 to 2009 including PowerPoint presentations of 3-13/20-07 and 4-24-07 also attached.

**Section 1. Department of Defense recommendations:**

The airplane attack last Thursday on the IRS building in Austin Texas (<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html>) only heightens our concerns about putting all our most vital public safety and emergency response assets in one high-rise building. Furthermore, federal standards for the location and design of Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's) contradict both the planning and design of the current proposal:

Excerpt from 2008 U.S. Department of Defense document *Emergency Operations Center Planning & Design*:

**“ 3-5.2.5 The EOC should not be located in a high-rise building or next to a highrise building that can collapse. ...” [1]**

Excerpt from 2007 Federal Emergency Management Agency document *Site and Urban Design for Security*:

**“... options such as the comparative risks (and cost to mitigate) of different locations ... must be subject to analysis and evaluation to enable a comprehensive risk management plan to be developed.” [2]**

The threat assessment consultants hired for this project have told us they were not asked to evaluate different locations, nor were they asked to comment on the wisdom of the highrise design. It appears, instead, that their scope of work was narrowly constrained to exclude evaluation of potentially less expensive and less vulnerable alternatives.

**(1) COUNCIL REQUEST:**

**(Resolution request:** Please address this Department of Defense recommendation against locating EOC facilities in a high-rise building. What percentage of new EOC facilities built in the last 10-years (since the World Trade Tower attack) have been located in high-rise buildings?

**(1) RESPONSE:**

The DOD document cited is specifically for Department of Defense EOC facilities with implications for national security. These standards are not intended for municipal facilities. Significant additional research would be required to determine the number of Municipal EOC facilities which have been built in mid/high rise buildings in the past ten years.

Regarding the recent airplane attack on the IRS building in Austin, Texas, it should be obvious that low-rise buildings in suburban locations are potential targets and vulnerable to such attacks. The lesson is that *any* building in *any* location can be vulnerable to attacks, not just high-rise buildings in downtowns. The security design for any facility must be tailored for each specific program, building configuration, and site: There is not a single approach that meets the needs of all projects. As communicated previously, city staff (including our three public safety leaders) and consultants are confident this site and this program provide a safe, secure and efficient environment for our public safety employees.

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**Section 2. Cost management documents for alternative sites:**

**(2) COUNCIL REQUEST :**

Please provide all cost management documents produced during the budgeting and design processes for this project, analyzing the cost impacts of locating the EOC functions at a less vulnerable site.

**(2) RESPONSE:**

It was not within the project scope of the Lightner Center programming or design to analyze alternative sites, as the site and preliminary outline of the program had been previously approved by the City Council before KlingStubbins was engaged. Therefore no such reports were produced.

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**Section 3. Threat Assessment Report concern:**

Our Feb 2nd memo quoted the consultant's Threat Assessment Report for this building: **"With both the exterior grounds and the ground floor of the facility open for unscreened public access, the hand-delivery of an improvised explosive device in these areas such as in a backpack or briefcase is a serious concern."** In effect, this building would be less secure from this threat than the existing Police Headquarters. Staff's response to our Feb 2nd memo did not address this concern.

**(3) COUNCIL REQUEST :**

Please respond to this Threat Assessment Report concern.

**(3) RESPONSE:**

The passage quoted from the Threat Assessment Report was not intended as public information and was quoted out of context. This passage was a preliminary finding from the initial section of the first of three reports. In this passage the security consultant identified one out of many potential threats and vulnerabilities to the facility, as they would have done for any design on any site: This was precisely what they were hired to do. In the subsequent sections of this report and in two additional detailed reports they made specific recommendations to the City and design team as to how to mitigate these threats through the design of the site and building. Working in close collaboration with the City staff, and the Chiefs of Police, Fire, and Emergency Communications these recommendations were carefully evaluated and incorporated by the design team into the design of the building to ensure that the building would be a highly secure environment for the public safety employees.

The ground floor lobby is partitioned to give the Police Department flexibility for access control: If desired they may allow unscreened access to limited areas of the lobby or they may require all persons to pass through screening. The Lightner Center is designed with many security provisions that will make it a significantly more secure facility than the existing Police building at 110 So. McDowell Street:

- Full perimeter force protection from vehicular intrusion: Currently none exists.
- Fully controlled, gated access to the side and rear service alleys: The site currently has totally uncontrolled access.
- A single staffed entrance with security screening: The existing building has two entrances on two levels that must be staffed.
- Clear lines of sight from the sergeant's desk to all pedestrian approaches: The existing facility has very poor lines of sight from the entrance.
- Progressive collapse resistant structure: The existing structure is vulnerable to progressive collapse.
- Blast resistant glazing in critical areas: The existing building has none.

It cannot be emphasized enough that the Chiefs of the Police, Fire, and Emergency Communications departments unanimously endorse the current design on the current site. Of numerous sites considered, they found the selected site to be the best from a security standpoint based on the following factors:

- Only two sides of the site are exposed to public streets.
- The north and western edges are City-controlled property which will never be developed for private uses.
- The eastern exposure faces the AT&T switch building, a windowless structure.
- The southern exposure faces Nash Square, a State-owned public park that will never be built upon.
- The absence of railroads, manufacturing facilities, hazardous materials storage facilities, or interstate highways (all high-risk elements) in close proximity.

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## **Section 4, Cost and security implications of the Threat Assessment**

### **Report:**

“According to Council minutes of 6/19/2007 and the staff estimate of 12/16/09, the cost of this project grew from \$100/sq ft to over \$200/sq ft. between 2007 and 2009. A substantial part of that increase was likely due to ‘hardening’ of the high-rise structure in response to the Threat Assessment Report of September 2008. Staff clearly took the bomb threats seriously, as the designers told us they beefed up both the perimeter columns and curtain wall against truck bomb threats, and beefed up interior columns against hand-held bombs that could be carried un-screened into the first two floors of the building.”

### **(4) COUNCIL REQUEST:**

Please explain why the cost and security implications of the Threat Assessment Report were not brought to Council for discussion. [This is a *process question* rather than a *resolution question*, but it deserves a straightforward answer at the appropriate time.]

(5)

### **(4) RESPONSE:**

The Minutes of the meeting regarding this item referred to in the Council’s memorandum #2 follow:

**(City Council Meeting 2007-06-19, page 38)**

### **REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BUDGET & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE**

#### **CLARENCE E. LIGHTNER PUBLIC SAFETY CENTER – SCHEDULE AUTHORIZED; – RFP PROCESS APPROVED**

Mayor Meeker reported the Budget & Economic Development Committee recommends approval of the schedule and action steps as recommended by Administration to begin the process for the Clarence E. Lightner Public Safety Center as included in the agenda packet. The first step would be beginning the RFP process for design services. On behalf of the Committee, Mayor Meeker moved the recommendation be upheld. His motion was seconded by Mr. West. Ms. Taliaferro questioned the cost involved with the Mayor pointing out the overall project is approximately \$100 million. City Manager Allen pointed out we will know the figures by budget time next year and the reason for this

proposal is to get a better cost so we can move forward. He stated it will not cost anything to do the RFP except advertising, etc. Mr. Crowder stated he wanted to make sure that when we do the RFP and move forward with this project that we make it an environmentally friendly civic building which is sustainable, green architectural designs, etc. The motion as stated was put to a roll call vote which resulted in all members voting in the affirmative. The Mayor ruled the motion adopted on an 8-0 vote. **END OF MINUTES**

Based on the information above, (also see attached Council and Committee items summary and power point presentations of 3-13-07 and 4-24-07) dividing the \$100 million dollar figure by the very preliminary 258,000 gross sq ft conceptual program estimate developed by previous consultants during the site selection process which generated the BED item reported out above, yields a per sq ft cost estimate before any schematic design or program development of \$386. Further, City projects are not typically related to total project costs on a sq ft basis as the General Accounting procedures we operate under capitalize only hard costs for a project per sq ft basis. Additionally, the total project costs may include, as this project does, relocations and temporary facilities where those upfit costs will be capitalized separately in our accounting system with those buildings.

We do not find the referred to cost estimates of \$100/SF to \$200/SF for this facility or any facility of this nature in the minutes or the documents supporting the agenda item. Perhaps the Council members could clarify the issue.

Some cost premiums for the Lightner Center are attributable to the security measures. To clarify the term 'hardening', the Lightner Center is designed structurally to prevent progressive collapse, has full perimeter access control to prevent vehicle intrusion, has very limited areas of ballistic glazing, and limited areas of blast-resistant glazing based on evaluation of potential threats by consultants and Police Department. Our cost estimates show that these measures may have added approximately \$3.3 million to the overall cost of the facility. Considerable portions of costs for technology and related to redundancy of utility services and building systems, which are wholly independent of the security measures, would apply to any ECC/EOC/ Fire /Police facility.

All of these costs were included in the project cost estimates at all design phases and presented to City Council and approved in multiple City Council meetings. While all the details of the security measures were not discussed in open meetings, they certainly were acknowledged as being incorporated into the design and contributing to the total project budget.

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### **Section 5 City-owned site information:**

#### **(5) COUNCIL REQUEST:**

Please provide the previously requested city-owned site information.

#### **(5) RESPONSE:**

City staff has developed a map of “downtown” sites (attached) owned by the City that may be considered for potential uses.

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### **Section 6 Cost estimate for program on alternative site:**

**(6) COUNCIL REQUEST:** Once a suitable alternate site is selected, have the current design team provide a detailed cost estimate to construct the emergency services program listed above, on the selected site.

#### **(6) RESPONSE:**

A contract for additional services to evaluate alternative sites will be negotiated and presented for Council approval, once direction is provided of which site(s) should be evaluated.